We look for optimal strategies to defend valuable goods from the attacks of offenders. Two complementary approaches are used: agent-based modeling and game theory. A Nash equilibrium is found considering the good values and the chance of success. The bifurcation diagram of the Nash-equilibrium as a function of the ∧ relative values of the goods is non-monotonic. Physica A xx (xxxx) 
The game of the two goods
Let us consider a simple mathematical game with two players: one thief R and one guard C . Since the benefits of the thief 2 are the losses of the guard, the game is defined as a zero-sum one. The goal of the guard is to minimize his losses, whereas 3 the goal of the thief is to maximize his benefits. Each player can choose between two sites A and B. Each choice constitutes 4 one of their strategies. 5 It is assumed that the payoff each player obtains for each of the four possible pairs of strategies depends on both the 6 probability of success of the thief if he chooses to attack site i and the guard chooses to protect site j (Π ij ) and the value 7 of each site (α i ). Besides, it can be supposed that the thief's success is only prevented by the encounter with the guard and 8 thus, Π AB = Π BA = 1. If we rename Π AA = Π A and Π BB = Π B , the payoff matrix for the thief is given by 1 :
A solution of the game corresponds to a pair of strategies adopted by each player. Since each player seeks the best payoff, if 11 one player plays at random, the other one could find a strategy that maximizes his benefits and then, in a zero-sum game,
12
that maximizes the losses of the opponent. It is well known that for a zero-sum game at least a Nash equilibrium exists and it
13
coincides with the one produced by maximin and minimax strategies. Indeed, minimizing the opponent's maximum payoff
14
(minimax rule) is identical to minimizing one's own maximum loss and to maximizing one's own minimum gain (maximin 15 rule) [6] .
16
It seems reasonable to assume that (i) the thief R always prefers the site without surveillance (i.e. that one not chosen by 17 the guard C ) and (ii) the guard C always prefers going to the same site chosen by the thief R. The first condition means that: 
25
In order to compute the mixed Nash equilibrium, let us suppose that the thief R chooses a mixed strategy q R , where q R is 26 the probability that R plays strategy A. 2 The payoff for the guard C is: 
29
As it is well known, q R represents a mixed Nash equilibrium if every C 's strategy is a best response to it, that is, once R has 30 chosen q R , C gets the same payoff for every strategy he chooses. Therefore,
32
By solving this equation we obtain the mixed Nash equilibria as a function of ρ ( Fig. 1) :
1 Appendix A presents a brief analysis of the general case. 
The partial derivatives of q * R with respect to every parameter show that it always decreases with ρ and Π B and increases 3 with Π A . Moreover, it presents jumps at ρ = Π B and ρ = 1/Π A that indicate that the thief is indifferent to his strategies 4 because both of them provide him the same payoff, but he will prefer the one that allows the guard to maintain this 5 indifference. In addition, q * C increases with ρ, that means that the guard tends to choose A as it becomes more attractive.
6
Therefore the thief prefers going towards B in order to avoid the guard, but if A becomes too valuable to be ignored then he predictable behavior: the interest of both players for a site (in particular, site A) increases if its level of protection decreases.
10
This is obvious for the thief and thus for the guard too, who prefers to follow and hinder the thief. The corresponding payoffs 11 of the players are given in Appendix A.
12
Further understanding of the behavior of the model can be obtained by considering some particular cases. When the 13 probability of success of the thief is the same in both sites, i.e. Π A = Π B = Π, then the mixed Nash equilibria reduce for 14 Π < ρ < 1/Π to:
.
16
As it can be seen, q *
That is, as A is more valuable than B, the preference of the guard to protect A is greater 17 than the preference of the thief to attack this site. Besides, it can be noted that the following identity holds: , q *
. Out of this range, it takes constant values 0 and 1, respectively, for ρ < Π and ρ > 1/Π . Consider now q * R . It does not depend on Π (the thief does not choose which site to attack in terms of the probability of 1 winning in that place because he has the same probability of ∧ success in both sites A and B) and it decreases when ρ increases, i.e. the more B decreases its value, the more the thief prefers it. Finally consider the expression of q *
that is the case of equivalent goods randomly chosen; instead, as Π increases then q * C decreases if ρ < 1 while it increases 4 if ρ > 1. Hence, the more the thief's probability of success increases, the more the guard prefers the most attractive site.
5
With Π fixed, q * C increases as ρ increases: hence the more B decreases its value, the more the guard prefers A. So the guard Another interesting particular case occurs when ρ = 1, i.e. when the two goods have the same attractiveness α. Then,
10
for every value of Π A and Π B , the mixed Nash equilibrium for both players can be written as follows (see Fig. 5 ):
13
With Π B fixed, q * increases when Π A increases, while with Π A fixed, q * decreases when Π B increases. That is: both players 14 choose the goods that the thief can get easier. Obviously, in the particular case with Π A = Π B = Π (the goods are perfectly 15 equivalent) the following values are obtained:
Hence, both players give the same importance to the sites and gain the mean value of the payoffs for pure strategies. model that simulates the spatial dynamics of two agents that allows an estimation of these two probabilities.
Simulating the game in the plane: an agent-based model

1
A natural implementation of the game defined in the previous section is in a bidimensional space. If we look at a city map 2 we see that banks are located in fixed points, separated by a certain distance that could be measured in terms, for instance, 3 of city blocks. It could be considered that two players, a thief and a guard, move on the city map and play to obtain the largest 4 payoff. At each time step, they play a strategy according to their payoff matrices that now are a function of their position as 5 well as the location of the (two) goods (banks). Essentially, during the simulation they are playing an attack-defend-pursuit-6 scape game whose dynamics can not be deduced from the theoretic game analyzed in the previous section. As we are going 7 to see, the agent-based simulations provide a good calibration of the probabilities Π A and Π B for different parameter setups.
8
Our city map is defined as a rectangular grid formed by 20 × 14 points (obtained as regular partition of each side of the 9 rectangle) with a 1-norm distance. Formally, if P(x 1 , x 2 ) and Q (x 2 , y 2 ) are two points in the grid, the distance between them 10 is given by:
12
We consider two separate sites A and B
3 with values α A and α B , respectively, and two agents: a thief R that wants to get the 13 goods from the sites and a guard C that protects the sites in order to minimize the possible losses. The thief (resp. guard) 14 must decide which site he prefers to attack (resp. to defend) and, once there, he has to select the strategy to follow.
15
Let us denote q R and q C the probabilities, respectively, for the thief and for the guard to choose A. These probabilities 16 depend on the specific characteristics of the problem. In particular, the probability q R is a function of the values of the goods that:
where f R is the preference of thief for site A when α A = α B (i.e. ρ = 1). A similar definition applies for q C .
21
Simulations can be divided in two phases. Firstly, agents just have to choose a site. Secondly, if both agents have chosen Each simulation is a possible realization of the process and the outcome depends on the parameter setup used. Note that,
26
as defined above, the goods are the agents' main interest (independently of the opponent strategy). Nevertheless, only few 27 changes in the dynamical rules would allow to take into account also the case in which the thief simultaneously wants both 28 to get the goods and to escape from the guard and the guard wants both to protect the goods and to catch the thief. This 
39
We focus our study on the case where the goods placed in A are more valuable than those placed in B. In particular, we
∧
As a consequence, we assume that the guard mainly prefers to defend the more valuable site. Hence, we take
Besides, we assume that the probabilities that drive the thief's movement are given by the following setup: In what follows, we study the behavior of the system for three different values of the thief's preferences for both sites, i.e. we take f R as the control parameter.
4
The thief and guard have the same preference. Assume first that thief has a strong preference for site A. Concretely, we 5 take: 
10
The thief has equal preferences. Let us now assume that the thief has no special preference for any site (i.e. he does not mind 11 about the value of goods), whereas the guard still maintains his strong preference to defend the most valuable site.
12
Hence, we take:
14
In this case, the thief gets the goods 65% of the since α A > α B , the total payoff of the thief is lower than in the ∧ previous case.
16
The thief has a strong preference for the less valuable site. Let us finally assume that the thief prefers to move to the site B, 17 less protected by the guard. For instance, let us take:
19
This strategy could be viewed as a reasonable response to the strong preference of the guard for site A. In this case, Obviously, as we said before, this choice could be considered as successful if the final payoff of the thief is large enough. This, as we have discussed in the previous section, depends on ρ, the ratio between the value of the goods.
23
∧
As a consequence, sometimes it seems more convenient for the thief to go toward the less precious treasure in order
24
to avoid the encounter with his opponent, even if this means not getting the maximum benefit. Obviously, reacting to the 25 strategies of the thief, the guard could change his preference for A or the way of protecting the goods in order to lower the 26 number of the thief's successes.
27
To study how the system parameters affect the output of the agent-based model, we have simulated the process using always the same number of times for every strategy chosen by the guard. We use the value of q i obtained at the Nash 34 equilibrium as a function of ρ and, then, we find an optimal f i by inverting the formula (2):
The agent-based model can be applied to calibrate the probabilities P A and P B . As before, let us assume that A is more 38 valuable than B. Then, we can suppose that the guard has a larger preference to choose site A and to stay close to the goods 39 than to patrol.
∧
As a consequence, we can expect that the thief has a lower preference to attack this site. Instead, when the guard is in B, he can decide also to patrol around and so the thief is more enticed to attack this site. For example, this situation 
Discussion and concluding remarks 46
The protection of valuable goods from the attack of offenders is one of the main challenges faced by security forces. This is a complex adaptive problem that depends on multiple factors, in particular on the value of the goods and the security 48 measures that protect them. In this paper we have presented a simple model that has been studied by means of two 49 complementary approaches: game theory and agent-based modeling.
50
In Section 2, we consider a game model where one guard protects two valuable sites from the attack of one thief. This is 51 a zero-sum game whose static properties can be completely solved in terms of its mixed Nash equilibria. These equilibrium points are studied as a function of the ratio between the values of the goods ρ = α A /α B and the probability of success Π ij 1 for each of the four pairs of strategies of the game.
2
In Section 3 we simulate the theoretic game in a plane by means of an agent-based model. Firstly, both players have to 3 choose between the two sites. Secondly, if both of them have chosen the same site, then they play a spatial game whose 4 characteristics depend on the parameter setup, namely the tendency to attack (defend) or to escape (patrol) for the thief
5
(guard), respectively. As expected, the simulations show a complex dynamics whose dependence on the system parameters 6 is not evident.
7
The dependence of the Nash equilibria on ρ has a clear meaning. Assume that A and B are two metro stations and that 8 their values are the number of passengers passing through them. Hence, it is reasonable that α A and α B vary during the day 9 and so, to study how the equilibria react to their changes makes sense. The study of q * R and q * C in terms of the probabilities 10 of winning for the thief is also natural. The change of Π A or Π B is equivalent to modifying the level of protection of the 11 sites A and B, respectively. Therefore, knowing the Nash equilibria as a function of these two parameters allows to test the 12 efficiency of different protection measures. The values of Π A and Π B that minimize the losses of the guard for a given ρ 13 could represent the optimal protection strategies. A sound conclusion that can be derived from this study is that a thief who 14 has to choose to steal one of two different goods will prefer the less valuable one as far as the ratio between the two values 15 does not exceed a threshold point related to the protection level of the goods.
16
We would like to point out the interplay between the two techniques applied in this paper. We have seen how the 17 use of game theory allows to obtain qualitative information about complex problems where several agents interact among 18 them and with the environment they move in. In particular, game theory provides optimal strategies as functions of some 19 characteristic parameters of the system. Nevertheless, in order to be calibrated, this kind of model needs real data that 20 in the field of criminality are really hard to be obtained from any source. To overcome this difficulty, agent-based models
21
can be used to accomplish simulations that reproduce the situation under study. In this sense, a relevant question to be 22 addressed in future work is how the outputs of the guarding game played in the agent-based model depend on p R and p C .
23
With respect to the guard, varying this parameter means choosing different protection strategies: from patrolling (p C = 0) The payoff matrix for the thief is then defined as follows:
It is not difficult to obtain the value of q R at the mixed Nash equilibrium:
7
The value of the probability that the guard C plays A, q C can be computed in a similar way:
9
Note that q * 
12
In particular, when ρ = Π BB /Π AB the payoffs of the thief R for the guard playing B are equal for both pure strategies of R.
13
So, the thief is indifferent to which strategy to follow, but he will prefer A with a 'little' probability in order to induce C to 14 play B. A 'little' probability means:
18
Similarly,
20
Here, [, ] means a multivalued function.
21
Using these expressions of q * R and q * C , the payoffs of the players in equilibrium when
are given by:
Note that this function is continuous but not derivable in ρ = Π BB /Π AB and ρ = Π BA /Π AA .
25
In general, it is reasonable to have max{Π AA , Π BB } < min{Π AB , Π BA } because the presence of the guard in the sites re-26 duces the probability of success for the thief. When, in particular, it is supposed that Π AB = Π BA = 1 we obtain the results
27
presented in Section 2. For this case, it is straightforward to compute the payoffs of the players in the Nash equilibrium:
This function is continuous with respect to every parameter, but it is not derivable for ρ = Π B and ρ = 1/Π A . Moreover, in 
Appendix B 1
The game presented is perfectly equivalent to the one in which C starts having both goods (α A + α B ) and at the end gains 2 what R did not steal:
The previous zero-sum game has been transformed more generally into a constant-sum one, where the benefits and losses 5 of all players sum up to the same value α A + α B for every outcome. Since payoffs can always be normalized, constant-sum 6 games may be represented as (and are equivalent to) zero-sum games.
7
The two games described are equivalent in the sense that the same expressions for the mixed Nash equilibrium, computed 8 in the previous section with the first payoff matrix, are found using this new payoff matrix.
9
What is changing is the payoff of the guard: if P
C is the payoff found with the first payoff matrix and P (2) C is that one found 10 with the new matrix, then P
(1)
C .
11
If players use mixed strategies (Π B < ρ < 1 Π A ), it can be found:
13
Appendix C
14
The strategies of the players during this spatial game are implemented as follows:
15
• Here, ''minimize the distance from/to the goods chosen'' means that the agent moves to the point that is closest to the 5 goods (compared with its neighbor points). When the agent ''moves randomly around the goods'', he selects one of the four 6 points of his nearest neighborhood by chance and moves towards it.
7
